Europe Alone

Supporting Ukraine, Rearming, and Deterring Russia without the US

Preface

Hello everyone. This is my first substack. I have pondered for some time what to post first. I decided this text, because of all the press requests on the Trump-Putin meeting.

I wrote this text for the National Defence Academy in spring this year, the German original is here: https://www.bmlv.gv.at/wissen-forschung/publikationen/publikation.php?id=1242

So I made an English version and updated it here and there. However the main points (1) there is nothing to be expected from Trump/Witkoff, (2) Europe needs to support Ukraine alone and urgently adjust procurement and spending for this, (3) only if Europe can keep Ukraine afloat it will earn Moscow’s respect and hence prevent the next, larger Russian-European war through deterence.

And I am kind of tired explaing that all over agan with each and every new twist and drama of the Trump-Putin-negotiation-scam.

Europe Alone

Ukraine support, rearmament and the deterrence of Russia without U.S. assistance
by Gustav C. Gressel

When Russia on 24 February 2022 escalated its war against Ukraine into a full-scale invasion, far more was at stake for Europe than the fate of Ukraine alone. In the years before, Russia had already declared its dissatisfaction with the political order in Europe.

In December 2021 Moscow became concrete. It demanded a new security order that should not only grant Russia an exclusive sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, but — by reversing NATO’s eastward enlargement and withdrawing American troops and nuclear weapons from Europe — also declare the European continent the object of Russian coercive measures. It was thereby clear that Moscow wanted to realise its self-claimed great-power role through a position of supremacy over the Europe as a whole. Turning Ukraine into a compliant vassal state was the first step into this “new world”.

To halt, or even nip in the bud, this new Russian world and to uphold the principles of the “old order” — sovereignty and legal equality of states — Europeans sought at least to secure Ukraine’s military survival. That Kyiv must not lose the war and that there must be no dictated peace according to Moscow’s wishes was the minimal consensus to which even the most hesitant chancellor subscribed. In the implementation of this minimal strategy Europe leaned heavily on the United States, even though the then U.S. President Joe Biden himself never developed a long-term plan for how this goal might be achieved. Instead, policy scrabbled along, doing just the minimum necessary to prevent Ukraine from collapsing. That hesitation is now exacting a price, because under Donald Trump American military assistance to Ukraine is running out while Europe is only at the start of a rearmament process that promises defensive readiness only in the medium term.

Peace through weakness?

Even as a presidential candidate Donald Trump loudly promised to end the Russo-Ukrainian war, without, however, having thought through how and what preparatory measures would be necessary do achieve this. In a mixture of overconfidence, ignorance and a primitive kind of populist-pacifism he believed he could broker a “deal” relatively quickly.

At first Trump hired the retired General Keith Kellogg, who essentially proposed the continuation of Biden’s policy — wrapped in MAGA rhetoric: a ceasefire should be sought, Ukraine should remain a sovereign and defensible state, and if Russia were not willing to negotiate, military support for Ukraine would be increased.

However, that evaporated after the first direct telephone call between Trump and Putin, in which the Kremlin was able to thoroughly capture the American president with its narratives. Kellogg was also replaced by Steve Witkoff, who in an almost subservient manner replicates Russian propaganda. Since then Putin has repeatedly been testing whether the United States would be willing to apply pressure to Moscow: through targeted, high-profile attacks on civilians in Ukraine, through provocations against European allies, and not least through the demonstrative delay of negotiations with Ukraine. Yet nothing in the United States has led to consequences, and Putin now has a fairly clear picture that he has a free hand in Ukraine and probably also in Europe.

The negotiations in Istanbul were nothing other than a sham fight. Russia’s demands for Ukraine’s capitulation and transformation into a vassal state have been known since 2022 and have not changed in the slightest since. The demand for capitulation is concealed under the terms “de-militarisation” (i.e. the disarmament of the Ukrainian army so the country can be occupied defenseless) and “de-Nazification” and new elections (i.e. Moscow’s demand to install a governor). That Moscow has not retreated from these maximal demands since the days before the invasion shows that the Kremlin is confident it can still win this war militarily.

But instead of threatening consequences and increasing pressure on Moscow, the Trump administration has tried to appease Putin by making concessions: at the United Nations it now votes with Venezuela, North Korea and Iran so as in no way to condemn Russia in toothless resolutions; Russian demands (for example Ukraine’s renunciation of NATO membership) are accepted without expecting reciprocation; measures to curb Russian influence (for example in cyber and information security) are unilaterally rolled back; active cyber operations against Russia are halted (whereas Russia’s attacks against the USA run unhindered); Putin’s — non-existent — willingness to negotiate is extolled in public communications; and “ultimata” put up expire without consequences. The pinnacle of an anti-Ukrainian propaganda campaign by the U.S. government was the suspension of all military assistance (including equipment that Ukraine had itself paid for) and the cessation of intelligence sharing in early March 2025.

Of course, the demonstrative display of weakness and subservience by Trump has in no way made Putin more willing to talk. On the contrary, it has reinforced in Moscow a feeling of superiority and certainty of victory. While the United States are diplomatically humiliated and shown up, the war is continued with all severity in order to decide it militarily in Moscow’s sense. Negotiations with Russia are not the only place where the Trump administration shows weakness — whenever the president encounters significant resistance or continuing his policies is associated with serious risks, Trump concedes to his opponent: in the trade dispute with China he quickly withdrew high tariffs without gaining significant concession from Beijing (for example a revaluation of the renminbi). He took on the Houthis with great swagger, but when they nearly shot down two American warplanes he promptly proclaimed “victory” and a separate ceasefire. Of course to this day no one knows what that victory actually consisted of. Equally with Iran the U.S. started a bombing campaign but stopped immediately after a few days leaving many Iranian sites damaged but not destroyed and Uranium reserves untouched. Again the Trump administration talks about a deal that given the circumstances is wishful thinking at best. From such a soft and risk-averse, cowardly American president one should not expect decisive pressure on Moscow — even if Putin “disappoints” him. Even if some Republican senators attempt to present themselves as hawks with loud rhetoric, that is nothing but domestic PR. No decisive action is to be expected from the Trump administration.

Without pressure that could alter Moscow’s position, the negotiation farce can only end in two scenarios:

1. Trump and Putin sign a “peace agreement” over the heads of Ukrainians and Europeans: without pressure on Russia such an agreement can only come about through American capitulation, i.e. by fully accommodating Russian interests. That would deprive a European state against its will not only of parts of its territory but also of its sovereignty. None of that Ukraine can accept. Nor can the rest of Europe tolerate external powers deciding over the head of a European country in this way. There would be many further potential victims of American-Russian friendship and cooperation agreements.

2. The USA withdraws from the negotiations and places the blame for the failure of the treaty on former allies such as Ukraine: that would mean military and financial support for Ukraine would be history and Russia would continue the war. However, the conditions of the U.S. withdrawal are negotiable at the margins: for example the U.S. could allow Europeans to continue to purchase weapons and ammunition for Ukraine.

From a European perspective it is of course sensible to attempt to steer matters diplomatically towards scenario two. This has been pursued so far by the so-called “coalition of the willing” led by France, Great Britain, Poland and Germany. What is, however, being overlooked is that in any case U.S. military support for Ukraine is running down. The military aid packages decided and financed under the Biden administration may still be delivered, but new aid packages are not in sight. The Kremlin’s delay tactics specifically aim at the expiry of this support. Moscow intends then to win the war under more favourable conditions. In any case Europe will be supporting Ukraine “alone”. If Europe fails to secure Kyiv’s military survival, not only would a free Ukraine be gone. Moscow would be confirmed in the assumption that Europeans would not be able to put anything up against a Russian attack.

Can Europe support Ukraine alone?

Even Zelenskyy admitted in an interview that Ukraine had little chance of survival without American support. It is not an easy undertaking, but not impossible. Since the West’s very hesitant response in 2022 to Ukrainian requests for armaments assistance, Kyiv has worked to revitalise its own production capacities. Considerable successes have been achieved in the fields of drones, light armoured vehicles, artillery, command and control systems as well as long-range weapons (cruise missiles, ballistic missiles), and the country has been made far less dependent on deliveries from abroad. Financial assistance from the EU and its member states has contributed significantly to this increase in capacity. However, drones alone will not save Ukraine, as the over the course of 2025 Russia has adapted its tactics and greatly improved its own drone capabilities.

Counter-drone efforts will be essential to Ukraine’s survival. As this is a complicated matter, it will be explained in a later text. Unfortunately Europeans long ignored the necessity of counter-drone capabilities (their own as well as Ukraine’s), putting them in a difficult spot to support this effort. However, the more European start-ups and enterprises learn about drone-warfare in Ukraine, the more they will be able to understand and contribute to the counter-drone effort as well.

Artillery ammunition cannot be produced in Ukraine in the quantities required. Ukraine needs at least 1.8 million rounds per year. In 2024 only 600,000 rounds were produced in the EU, and of those only about half were delivered to Ukraine. However, European production rose markedly again in autumn 2024, and in 2025 production of about 1.2 million rounds is expected. The target of 1.8 million rounds is to be realised through procurement contracts with third countries under the Czech ammunition initiative, which would cover Ukraine’s most urgent needs. Problematic, however, is rocket artillery. The U.S. produce 14,000 GMLRS rockets per year; in Europe, after long political wrangling, contracts for licensed production were only signed in May. It will still take years before ammunition comes off the production lines (had this been pursued decisively in March 2022, production would probably already be under way in Germany). Although the Trump administration currently permits the export of American ammunition from the stocks of European allies, it is unknown whether this practice will continue permanently or whether Trump will attach other conditions to his approval in future.

Europe also has significant production shortfalls in air defence. The USA produce 650 Patriot PAC-3 and 200 Patriot PAC-2 missiles per year, as well as 1,200 AIM-120s, which can also be fired by NASAMS. There are no reliable production figures for the Aster-30, which is comparable to the Patriot; extrapolating from munitions orders in recent years, one can estimate production at roughly 100 missiles per year. Around 500 IRIS-T missiles are produced per year in Germany. Long-term supply contracts for Patriot systems from the USA would of course considerably ease the situation. However, even under good conditions the U.S. bureaucracy itself needs six months to a year from request to completion of an arms-export transaction. That bureaucracy has in any case been considerably damaged by staff cuts and political appointments under Trump.

But even if the USA remained on board, the number of incoming air targets will far outstrip the production numbers of ammunition for western ground-based air-defence systems. Ukrainian estimates for 2025 anticipate Russian production of 600 ballistic missiles (Iskander-M, Kinzhal, KN-23), 2,600 cruise missiles (Kh-101, Kalibr, Iskander-K), and 34,000 Shahed-type drones. Ukraine will become all the more dependent on interceptor fighters to shoot down cruise missiles and drones. With the introduction of the F-16, Kyiv has once again become dependent on American spare parts supplies and pilot training, even though in this regard the Trump administration has approved support for continued operations. But as Ukraine’s Soviet fighter forces ages, wear and tear greatly accelerate in wartime, and combat losses mount (the latter two issues will not spare Western type fighters), more fighters will have to be delivered to Ukraine. It is unclear if the US would sell further F-16C/D it has in reserve stock. Other combat aircraft — for example Tranche 1 Eurofighters or further Mirage 2000s — could, however, be supplied by Europe. At least older Cold-War munitions — AIM-9 and AIM-7 — still exist in larger quantities. They are still suitable for combating cruise missiles. However, such deliveries would need to be prepared, since building up the logistical infrastructure and training ground and flying personnel takes far longer than with land vehicles.

Furthermore, production of air-defence systems can be stimulated inside Ukraine. During the Cold War S-300 rockets (5V55 in various versions) were manufactured, but production was discontinued after the collapse of the Soviet Union because some subcomponents were manufactured in Russia. Ukraine is now attempting to revive this production (project designation SD-300 or Klichen). With European subcomponents and European financing this effort can be accelerated.

And improvisation will be necessary to defend against the countless drones and to hold back high-value air-defence missiles for the most threatening aerial targets: laser weapons, jammers and interceptor drones developed in Ukraine are cheaper per shot than a European surface-to-air missile. Only a combination of all these means can at least limit the weakening of Ukrainian air-defence. At least the now-pledged German support for Ukrainian long-range weapon production could mean that Ukraine neutralises a larger share of Russian ammunition and long-range weapons in its own production facilities or ammunition depots and thereby reduces the number of missiles that actually have to be intercepted.

Even more difficult, however, is the realm of reconnaissance and early warning. According to the Military Balance, the USA currently operate 14 ISR satellites (imaging reconnaissance), 33 satellites for electronic reconnaissance, 11 satellites for space surveillance and 20 for early warning. In Europe France operates six imagery satellites and three for electronic reconnaissance, Germany eight satellites for radar and imagery reconnaissance, Italy seven, and Spain and the United Kingdom each one imagery reconnaissance satellite. European states will not be able to carry out electronic reconnaissance of Russian air-defence positions, the interception of Russian tactical communications, and early warning against Russian air strikes to the extent, with the accuracy and at the depth that the USA do today. That does not mean, however, that more could not be done. Ground-based sensors for the reconnaissance of electromagnetic signatures and passive radars to improve Ukrainian early-warning capability could be supplied by Europe. European states could also provide subcomponents and sensors to outfit Ukrainian reconnaissance drones for electronic reconnaissance missions. All that cannot replace the capacity of the USA, but it could help Ukraine to manage the situation.

Even though armoured vehicles no longer dominate the headlines in the Ukraine debate, Kyiv requires a steady resupply at least to make good losses to date. Light infantry without armoured vehicles has difficulty rotating forces even on static fronts. Moreover, tactical counter-attacks and delaying actions are constantly necessary to preserve a coherent defence. On average over the past three years Ukraine has lost 350 main battle tanks, 400 infantry fighting vehicles, 250 armoured personnel carriers, 150 self-propelled guns and 35 combat aircraft per year. So far efforts have been made to replace these losses by supplying decommissioned vehicles from stockpiles. A large part of the stored armoured vehicles (both eastern and western types) has meanwhile been refurbished and delivered to Ukraine. But European stockpiles of phased out vehicles will expire this year, and no effort has been made to initiate war-time vehicle production. Larger stockpiles of reserve-vehicles remain in the USA, and before Trump, Washington had delivered substantial stocks from its inventory — more than 300 M2 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles and over 1,100 M113 armoured personnel carriers — to Ukraine. Had Olaf Scholz decided to gear up German armoured vehicle production in 2022, Germany could substitute the US today. However this was not done, predominately because the chancellor had morale issues seeing German tanks fighting Russians over the battlefields of WWII. But as this would have been a costly effort, and German industry would have needed at least two years to gear up to war production, and many thought the war would be over by then. Even now, the new Merz government has spent eight month talking to Trump without ordering vehicles. Even if the utility of armoured vehicles will largely depend on the success of Ukraine’s counter-drone effort, drones and armoured vehicles have very different life-cycles and procurement spans — so you need to plan production much way ahead.

Only in artillery has a joint ramp-up of Ukrainian (over 300 2S22 Bogdana per year) and French production (140 Caesar per year) succeeded, enabling Ukraine to be supplied from active production. This not only allows Ukrainian losses to be replaced, but also makes it possible to equip further units and gradually replace older, worn artillery of Soviet origin. In the area of battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers Europe is far from being able to support Ukraine sustainably. Sweden and Denmark ordered 40 CV90s for Ukraine as part of their own CV90 orders. A planned assembly of KF-41 Lynx in Ukraine has, however, to date — despite countless announcements and framework contracts — not been financed. From Europeans and Australians deliveries scheduled for 2025 include 30 BMP-1/2, 50 Marder, 56 CV90, 64 Rosomak, 10 Leopard 2A4, 74 Leopard 1, 49 M1 Abrams and 20 T-72/M84. Even in Europe stored vehicles are running low or are in such poor condition that practical delivery is greatly delayed.

Ukraine is meanwhile relying on cheap MRAPs built on commercial chassis and economical to produce in large numbers. They can transport infantry on the battlefield. However, their formations also lose striking power that previously enabled them to conduct counter-attacks. This not only reduces Ukraine’s chance of placing Russia under military pressure again at a later date. Counter-attacks against Russian breakthroughs are also essential to stabilise the front over the long term. Here the Ukrainian army is increasingly struggling.

That the armed resistance has not already long ago collapsed is owed less to the West than to Ukraine’s own drone production. When American ammunition deliveries stalled in winter 2023/24, Ukraine began to systematise and expand its drone efforts. Until then drone capabilities within the army were very unevenly distributed, because a few well known brigades had good connections to manufacturers and volunteer organisations that organised steady supplies for them through donations. In 2023 drone schools were established and training systematised and standardised; in 2024 the service branch “unmanned systems” was founded with its own weapons schools and regulatory apparatus to increase the number and size of drone units and formations, and to better synchronise drone operations with those of conventional arms. In autumn 2024 newly formed drone regiments already achieved operationally significant defensive successes. In 2025 Ukraine will produce five million small drones. Already in 2024 Ukraine fired more than two million small drones — more drones than artillery shells. Beyond reconnaissance and fire support, drones are expanding into other roles such as casualty evacuation, resupply of forward units and engineering tasks (mine laying and clearing).

But on this front Ukraine also needs support. Russia is catching up and thanks to Chinese assistance has access to high-quality components and subcomponents. On the other hand China is attempting to restrict exports of parts to states suspected of re-exporting them to Ukraine. While drone components cannot be sourced in the quantities required, there are components that are superior in quality to Chinese ones (radio and control units, etc.). In addition, Russia has superior means of electronic warfare (jamming) and reconnaissance (detection and direction-finding of drone teams), which gives it certain advantages. Here too Europe could supply more (or supply Ukrainian production with specialised parts). These components are specifically relevant for the counter-drone effort, which is of utmost urgency.

Ukraine’s public relations faces considerable problems with this change as well. Systems that were needed in the past were tangible to the public (Leopard main battle tanks, F-16 combat jets or Taurus cruise missiles); the new battle-deciding devices are circuit boards, antennas and sensors that are often not even listed on the websites of their already little known manufacturers. That makes it hard to drum up public support, and accordingly many European politicians feel little pressure.

From Putin’s point of view it is therefore initially a matter of waiting to see whether Ukraine can keep afloat without American support. In summer and autumn the Russian army will be able to mount an offensive against a presumably materially exhausted Ukrainian army. In the next winter of the war it will be able to attack Ukrainian cities, strategic infrastructure and armaments industry and will face a Ukrainian air defence suffering from ammunition shortages. Until Putin knows the result of both undertakings he will not be ready for substantive talks. Even though the Russian army is already showing significant signs of wear — and these will not improve in 2025 — the confidence in the Kremlin is high that the Ukrainian side will be the first to collapse under the burden of the offensive war.

This is also because Europeans did not prepare for a possible Trump presidency, and after his seizure of power fell into the illusion that their primary task was to keep the United States on board. Had Europe prepared in 2024 for a possible second Trump term and boosted production of key armaments and ammunition types, concluded long-term supply contracts with the USA (and high contractual penalties in the event of cancellation), one would be facing a different situation today. For none of the problem areas mentioned above is there a “straightforward” solution in the sense of a qualitatively and quantitatively equivalent European substitute for missing American kit. Gaps can only be closed by a combination of purchases from third countries, improvisation, further scaling up of the Ukrainian armaments industry and the ramping up of European production.

Europe’s rearmament needs

After three years of the campaign of aggression Russia was able to occupy roughly 20% of Ukrainian territory. The apparently creeping and clumsy advance of the Russian army lulls many observers in Europe into the deceptive certainty that Russia could do Europe no harm; after all Europe is larger and stronger than Ukraine. But the situation is not that simple. Since Russia escalated the war on 24.02.2022 into a full invasion with about 190,000 men, both the Russian and the Ukrainian armies have developed further quantitatively (mobilisation, voluntary recruitment) and qualitatively (integration of drone units and electronic warfare).

At the height of Russia’s exertion of force in 2024 there were not only 650,000 Russian soldiers in Ukraine, but also 3,400 battle tanks, 7,000 infantry fighting vehicles and armoured personnel carriers, 5,000 artillery pieces, of which 1,000 were self-propelled and 2,000 multiple rocket launchers, organised into six army groups, 20 armies and three army corps.¹ Although Europe on paper possesses more equipment (without Turkey and Hungary: 3,987 battle tanks, 5,806 infantry fighting vehicles, 11,860 armoured personnel carriers, 1,851 self-propelled and 1,987 towed guns, 849 multiple rocket launchers and 1,582 combat aircraft),² that is a comparison of apples and oranges: the Russian systems are in the field whereas the European figures enumerate the total number of systems on paper. NATO’s goal of keeping at least 50% of land forces in a state of readiness is a political ambition at the time, to be fulfilled in the mid-2030s at best. Despite most European militaries are standing professional armies, most units require personnel and material augmentation before they can be deployed on operations.

In addition Europeans lack logistical depth, especially if the USA would not stand unitedly at their side. The United States produce a significant share of the ammunition required in Europe, particularly for combat aircraft, rocket artillery and air defence.

European armies also display considerable deficits today in the areas of material maintenance and repair. To keep the European vehicle sector alive in the face of dwindling orders, all European armies outsourced maintenance tasks that were previously performed by field workshops and depots to manufacturers. That has turned a small number of companies into bottlenecks both for new production and for maintenance.

Most European armies have meanwhile become professional armies with no or only small reserve components. The low personnel turnover of professional armies means that there are hardly any reserves of trained personnel. In the event of a war with Russia the training infrastructure would first have to be created so that legally possible mobilisations could actually be implemented. As a conscription army in 2022 Ukraine could revert to more than 400,000 demobilised veterans of the Donbas War to support its mobilisation and the enlargement and augmentation of its armed forces. Nevertheless, since 2024 it has been fighting personnel shortages and problems in conducting the training of newly conscripted personnel both qualitatively and quantitatively.

Moreover the Russian armed forces have also learned lessons from the drone revolution in this war. The high number of daily drone attacks led not only to adaptations in equipment but also required tactical adaptations across all arms. For this reason Ukraine halted tactical training offered by the EU and NATO at group to battalion level in 2024, because units and commanders trained in the West first had to be retrained to the altered operational conditions.

If European armies in their current state were to go into the field against this Russian army, the lack of tactical understanding of fighting under conditions of omnipresent small drones would lead to a very bloody learning curve. Of course, most European armed forces have launched programmes to close these knowledge and capability gaps. However, peacetime armies will need time to implement all these programmes. Even Ukraine being at war sometimes has difficulties to adapt. Tactical adaptation in war cannot be achieved in the blink of an eye.

The next capability gap that gives Europeans cause for concern is air defence. Europe would also struggle to shoot down thousands of cruise missiles and tens of thousands of long-range attack drones. Even Shahed drones can under favourable conditions hit targets at up to 2,000 km distance. Against the background of armaments-industrial “bottlenecks” in Europe the situation is problematic because many of these few but important defence companies are themselves within reach of such drones. Ground-based air defence exists in far too small numbers to protect the innumerable objects of critical infrastructure. Further orders will run into the 2030s; to defend against countless attack drones, for cost reasons a “territorial defence” with cheaper systems is necessary. In Ukraine mobile groups with machine guns and jammers embedded in digital command-and-information systems fulfil this task. Such structures do not exist in Europe. Their creation, above all the training of countless reserve air-defence units, will still take considerable time. The same applies to coastal protection against sea drones, which can be produced quickly in large numbers.

Europe therefore not only has rearmament needs caused by the peace dividend, but a far greater need for reform and adaptation in the defence sector. Becoming “fit for war” does not only mean re-acquiring equipment but increasing operational readiness, enhancing endurance and scalability of military effort, and the tactical-technical adaptation of European armed forces. In democracies under the rule of law and in peacetime public support for these adaptation measures must also be secured and the distribution of costs negotiated. During the time of unfinished reforms Europe would be extremely vulnerable to a Russian aggression.

To the rearmament and adaptation needs is added uncertainty about the reliability of the American ally. A Russian buildup directed against Europe, combined with nuclear threats against the Alliance, would be a crisis fraught with considerable risk. It would be extremely unlikely that Donald Trump would put the existence of the United States at risk to stop Putin. One cannot build deterrence on weakness and acquiescence — central features of “Trumpian” foreign policy. Although legalistic hurdles have been raised to the notion that Trump could leave NATO, the U.S. president in a treaty case has such a large margin of discretion in complying with alliance support that inaction and evasiveness are possible. And in the case of Trump such behaviour should surprise no one.

That, however, brings additional rearmament requirements for Europe, because the central command, communications and logistics functions, as well as the technical and intelligence reconnaissance that the USA has hitherto provided — without which the armed forces of individual NATO states are not capable of a large, coherent operation — would then have to be provided by European nations. Leading diplomats and military officers are already speaking of an “orderly withdrawal” of the USA from Europe. How much order there is in Trump’s foreign policy — especially under pressure — can be gauged from day-to-day practice.

In any case the requirement for arms and development necessary to continue supporting Ukraine without the USA largely coincides with what is required to defend Europe without the USA. Thus support for Ukraine is a dress rehearsal in which Europeans must prove they can shoulder this burden without themselves having to wage war.

Moscow will watch closely how the Europeans fare. So far the Kremlin does not place much value on them: Europe is regarded as an assortment of vassal states of the USA; without American leadership any European resistance would collapse. Now Europeans face a test: if they can show teeth in Ukraine, this could change the Kremlin’s calculation about the expected costs and risks of an offensive war beyond Ukraine. If empty rhetoric prevails, Moscow will be clear that, in the absence of American leadership, no significant resistance can be expected.

Outlook

But a Ukrainian defeat is neither inevitable nor currently in sight. Both armies, Ukrainian and Russian, are grappling with considerable problems. The Ukrainian army has personnel concerns; moreover, with the expiry of American military aid bottlenecks will arise in air defence and in ammunition for rocket artillery as well as for the air force. The extent to which these can be closed will also depend on the willingness and improvisation skills of Europeans to procure additional ammunition.

If, however, Ukraine survives the year 2025 and in its defensive fight inflicts similarly high material losses on the Russian attackers as in 2024, the situation would change significantly in Europe’s favour. Despite increased arms production, Russian land forces are primarily sustained by equipment refurbished from stockpiles. While Russia in 2024 could still claim to have “produced” 1,500 battle tanks and 2,500 infantry fighting vehicles (which mainly referred to refurbishment of mothballed vehicles), the armaments industry will increasingly have to shift in 2025–2026 toward the actual new production of armoured fighting vehicles. The extent to which that succeeds will also depend on whether Europeans can maintain pressure on Russia through sanctions, and in particular limit China’s role in this transformation process.

The material problems of the Russian army can force the Kremlin into strategic-political (negotiations) and operational (cessation of offensives) adaptations. But only if they reach a critical magnitude. America’s weakness will prolong this war; how long is largely in the hands of Europeans. While the 4.5 million workers currently employed in the Russian defence industry need two years to replace the annual losses of the Russian armed forces, Russia’s military “recovery capacity” will be weakened after 2026 as Moscow’s industrial transition towards new equipment takes time. That also offers Europe opportunities to build its own capacities to be able to guarantee its security by its own means.

Further military support for Ukraine by Europe is therefore not an act of charity; it lies in Europe’s most intrinsic security interest. Unfortunately this is not sufficiently anchored in the minds of the European public and of European decision-makers. European attention is currently mostly focused on American-Russian negotiations, as if these would lead to anything. Meanwhile only time passes which Europeans do not use to prepare for the failure of the Americans. Instead of musing about possible peacekeeping forces in the event of illusory ceasefires, an increase in arms production and emergency purchases — in particular of American Patriot surface-to-air missiles, ammunition for HIMARS, and Bradley infantry fighting vehicles — would be necessary. For the mobilisation of these resources will determine whether Putin will be able to implement his goals militarily or not. Only in the latter case will there be serious negotiations. If the former situation occurs, it is to be expected that Putin will exploit the Russian army’s lead in armaments and experience for further special operations. An American withdrawal from Europe or an internal political crisis around the next presidential election in 2028 could then provide the Kremlin with the long-desired opportunity to definitively smash the “European order”.